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For European observers, Switzerland’s system of industrial relations was for a 
long time synonymous with stability. During the post- war decades and up to the 
end of the 1980s, neither Switzerland’s trade union movement nor its liberal 
version of corporatism underwent any major changes. There was no ‘Hot 
Autumn’ of 1969 and ensuing surge in unionism as seen in Italy, no extension of 
workers’ co- determination rights as in Germany in the 1970s and no winter of 
discontent 1979 and crackdown on union rights in the 1980s as witnessed in the 
UK. Once the system of collective bargaining had been put into place at the 
beginning of the 1950s, Swiss trade unions settled into their role as subordinate 
partners in decentralized and consensual industrial relations. Confronted with 
very cohesive and powerful employers’ associations, they stuck to industrial 
peace and reaped the benefits of almost uninterrupted economic expansion. The 
growing labour market meant that unions were able to keep their membership 
figures stable without expanding into new sectors. Changes seemed all the less 
pressing, since the unions’ economic influence was further backed by political 
power: Switzerland’s consensus democracy provided the unions with a central 
role as intermediary in the making and implementing of social and labour market 
policy (Fluder and Hotz- Hart 1998; Degen 2006).
 This stability came to an abrupt end in the 1990s, a decade that confronted trade 
unions with three major challenges. The first challenge arose from the unusually 
long recession of the early 1990s; in Switzerland, the cyclical slump dragged on 
from 1991 until 1996 and hit the manufacturing and construction sectors particu-
larly hard. As a result, it also dealt a severe blow to membership in the traditional 
union strongholds. A second challenge was raised by the neoliberal turn in busi-
ness organizations. At the height of the crisis, the employers’ associations began to 
call for less labour market regulation and less binding collective bargaining. After 
decades of consensual industrial relations, this move by employers towards a more 
market- liberal position caught the trade unions off guard. Third, at the end of the 
1990s, the trade unions were facing a new challenge posed by the imminent 
opening up of Switzerland’s labour market to the EU. The resultant liberalization 
of labour migration threatened to undermine the unions’ influence on wage setting.
 These challenges – most notably declining membership and the calling into 
question of collective bargaining – put unions under pressure to initiate 
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revitalization efforts. After an extended period of disorientation, such efforts 
took place on three different fronts. First, Swiss unions responded to the harsher 
economic context by investing more resources in political action, using direct 
democratic instruments to block neoliberal reforms and hinder welfare state 
retrenchment. In parallel, they began to adopt new means of recruitment, target-
ing hitherto almost union- free private services, and resorted more frequently to 
industrial disputes. No longer the junior partner in the corporatist growth pact, 
they began to reposition themselves as an oppositional force. Finally, the Euro-
pean wave of union mergers also seized the Swiss labour movement, caught in 
its struggle against ongoing membership erosion. Starting in the mid- 1990s and 
gaining pace after 2000, a series of union mergers led to a profound restructuring 
of organized labour in Switzerland. We argue that efforts on these three fronts 
have helped Swiss unions to consolidate their influence and to partly compensate 
their historical weakness in private services.
 Our discussion is structured as follows. We begin with an overview of Swit-
zerland’s union structure and briefly portray the era of stable industrial relations 
up to the end of the 1980s. The next section then shows how the neoliberal turn 
and economic crisis of the early 1990s shook Swiss corporatism to its core, 
putting the unions on the defensive. In the subsequent three sections, we discuss 
union responses to the new challenges by first looking at the evolution of collect-
ive bargaining. We then discuss Swiss unions’ adoption of new recruitment prin-
ciples and how these innovations in collective action were accompanied both by 
stronger implantation in the service sector and by more frequent strikes. The last 
response discussed concerns the Swiss unions’ internal restructuring process 
through union mergers. My contribution concludes with an outlook on the role 
of the trade unions in Switzerland’s contemporary political economy.
Post- war stability in Switzerland’s industrial relations
In Switzerland, a consensus democracy holds together a multicultural society 
divided by cleavages of language, religion and class. The same pattern also 
applies to the union movement, which is fragmented and, at the same time, 
embedded in a highly cooperative system of industrial relations. Unlike in 
Austria or Germany, where the union structure was redrawn after the Second 
World War according to the principle of ‘one company, one union’, organized 
labour in Switzerland still reflects the cleavage structure of the beginning of the 
twentieth century (Ruf 1991: 39). It thus remains divided along religious and 
class lines. This leads to a mixture of cooperation and competition between the 
social- democratic and mainly blue- collar peak association SGB, its (formerly) 
Catholic blue- collar counterpart Travail.Suisse and several non- affiliated white- 
collar unions.
 Table 6.1 provides an overview of Switzerland’s union structure. It shows 
that the two rival peak associations are both dominated by a large multi- sector 
union resulting from recent mergers: Unia within SGB, Syna within Travail.
Suisse. Organized labour is fragmented and decentralized. Fragmentation is 
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illustrated by the fact that the largest peak association SGB comprises only 49 
per cent of all union members in Switzerland, to which Travail.Suisse adds 
another 21 per cent. Moreover, unlike ÖGB in Austria or CGIL, CISL and UIL 
in Italy, the two peak associations SGB and Travail.Suisse possess only limited 
authority over their member unions (16 unions within SGB, 12 within Travail.
Suisse). In Switzerland, power lies mainly with the individual unions: they are 
the ones to collect member fees, organize wage bargaining and sign collective 
agreements. This is reflected in the resources the different organizations have at 
their disposal: the largest peak association SGB thus employs fewer than 25 
people, its largest affiliated union Unia more than 900.
 Unions have traditionally been the junior partner in Switzerland’s corporatist 
arrangement, where employers exchange the collective regulation of minimum 
working standards for labour peace and a climate of cooperation. The power 
asymmetry between capital and labour is particularly marked in Switzerland: 
even in the heyday of industrialism, union membership was limited to a third of 
the workforce, and the left’s political support has never exceeded a third of the 
national electorate. Thus, union fragmentation stands in stark contrast with the 
high level of cohesion achieved by employers’ organizations (Kriesi 2006; see 
also Eichenberger and Mach in this volume).
 Several reasons have been cited in an attempt to explain this structural weak-
ness of the labour movement. In Switzerland’s culturally fragmented society, the 
strong salience of religious and linguistic identities hampered the political articu-
lation of the nascent class conflict from the outset. At the same time, Switzer-
land’s decentralized pattern of industrialization – based on hydropower instead 
of coal as an energy source and hence developing alongside watercourses – 
delayed the emergence of an urban working class. Unlike in Austria, the UK or 
Germany, many industrial workers, notably in the textiles industry, remained in 
rural labour markets until well into the twentieth century, which helped to keep 
older political loyalties intact (Gruner 1988: 54). Moreover, from the late nine-
teenth century until today, Switzerland’s working class has been internally 
divided not only by linguistic and religious conflicts, but also by the existence of 
a large migrant – primarily Italian – underclass. Finally, unlike in Scandinavia, 
Switzerland’s labour movement failed to win the peasantry as a political ally. 
Since the early twentieth century, farmers and industrialists have joined forces in 
an unusually solid national- capitalist bloc, thus effectively isolating the left 
(Gruner 1988: 1,408).
 In sum, the balance of power is not tipped in favour of the unions. Even 
today, corporatism is actively promoted by the federal government: faced with 
multiple lines of social conflict and weakened by the federal division of power, 
it invests strongly in interest accommodation through institutionalized exchange 
with both employers and unions. While Switzerland’s liberal version of cor-
poratism has never relied on Keynesian demand management (see Armingeon in 
this volume), organized capital and labour are integrated into the development 
and implementation of social and employment policy (Mach 2006). The unions’ 
position in corporatist policy making is to some extent secured by Switzerland’s 
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direct democratic institutions: by enabling large interest groups to call a referen-
dum on laws they oppose, they give unions a substantial veto power (Armingeon 
1997; Fischer 2003).
 The solid integration of the Swiss unions into the political sphere stands in 
contrast with their lack of embeddedness at the company level. Unlike in 
Germany, a close- knit system of influential works councils has not come into 
being. It was not until 1993 that the parliament, in an effort to harmonize Swiss 
law with European legislation, adopted a new employee participation act, which 
institutionalizes information and consultation rights for works councils in com-
panies with more than 50 employees. The demand to establish such a council 
must be supported, however, by a majority of a firm’s employees, and its legal 
powers go beyond information rights only in the event of mass redundancies. 
Works councils thus play a subordinate role in Swiss industrial relations, with 
the possible exception of the engineering and chemical industries and a series of 
large companies in other sectors (notably banking and insurance), where collect-
ive agreements afford them more significant competence, notably wage bargain-
ing rights. However, elections to works councils have much less bearing on 
union influence and union finances than in France, Italy or Spain. In Switzerland, 
unions depend for their resources primarily on member dues and additionally on 
solidarity contributions from collective agreements (fees raised by employers on 
non- unionized workers’ wages). The state neither directly nor indirectly subsi-
dizes the union system.
 At the end of the 1980s, Switzerland had a reputation as a haven of social 
peace. The long period of economic expansion, a stable system of sectoral col-
lective bargaining and the integration of the unions in corporatist policy making 
led to a particularly consensual and cooperative culture of industrial relations – 
to ‘social partnership’ to use the Swiss jargon. Accordingly, during the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s, the number of working days lost through strikes per 1,000 
employees was lower in Switzerland than in any other West European country 
(see Table 6.2). This had not always been the case: in the years preceding the 
First World War, capital and labour had been opposed in bitter antagonism, and 
between 1904 and 1913 incidence of strikes in Switzerland was almost as high 
as in Germany and higher than in France (Hirter 1988: 855). Industrial conflict 
reached a peak in 1918 in an almost countrywide general strike. The signature of 
a series of sectoral agreements, notably of the so- called ‘peace agreement’ in the 
machine industry 1937, reduced disputes in the interwar period. However, Swiss 
industrial relations were not pacified until the end of the 1940s, after unions 
gained the right in an extended wave of strikes to set up numerous collective 
agreements. Between 1945 and 1950, bargaining coverage was thus extended 
from about a quarter to half of all wage earners (Degen 2006: 216–17; Rieger 
2009: 103–4). This structure, based mainly on sectoral collective agreements, 
remained in place almost unchanged until the beginning of the 1990s.
 With a collective bargaining system that covers only half of the workforce, in 
international comparisons Switzerland ranks among the most market- liberal 
systems such as the UK or the United States: at the opposite end of the scale are 
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other small export- oriented European countries such as Austria, Belgium or 
Sweden with coverage rates of 80 per cent and higher (see Table 6.2). However, 
in combination with full employment and the strict regulation of labour migra-
tion, collective bargaining nonetheless provided a safety net for Switzerland’s 
low- wage sector and thus moderated earnings inequalities.2
 In the post- war decades, it was not only collective bargaining that was marked 
by stability, but also union membership (see Figure 6.1). At the beginning of the 
Table 6.2  Union density (in per cent), bargaining coverage (in per cent) and strike inci-
dence (workdays lost per 1,000 employees)
1970 1980 1990 2000
Austria Density 63 57 47 37
Coverage – 98 98 98
Strike 11 1 4 100
Belgium Density 42 54 54 56
Coverage – 95 95 95
Strike 275  – 34 42
France Density 22 18 10 8
Coverage – 85 92 95
Strike 286 119 77 103
Germany Density 32 35 31 25
Coverage – 70+ 60+ 60+
Strike 52 27 11 4
Italy Density 37 50 39 35
Coverage – 80+ 80+ 80+
Strike 1,511 623 158 140
Netherlands Density 37 35 24 23
Coverage – 85 82 86
Strike 40 15 22 14
Sweden Density 68 78 81 79
Coverage – 80+ 83 92
Strike 46 182 50 42
Switzerland Density 29 31 24 20
Coverage – 50+ 50+ 45+
Strike 2 0 2 4
United Kingdom Density 45 51 39 30
Coverage – 71 47 35
Strike 569 334 29 29
United States Density 24 20 16 13
Coverage – 26 18 14
Strike 507 123 40 52
Sources: union density, Visser (2006: 45); bargaining coverage, Visser (2007); strike incidence: Addison 
et al. (2007: 6).
Note
Strike incidence is the yearly average over a decade (1970–9, 1980–9, 1990–9, 2000–3).
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1960s, the largest confederation SGB counted about the same number of 
members as at the end of the 1980s (445,000). Membership had peaked after the 
oil crisis in 1976: in the absence of a state- run unemployment insurance scheme 
and with unemployment rates rising, workers joined unions in great numbers in 
order to gain access to an unemployment scheme (Ruf 1991: 48). These gains 
were, however, transitory and membership stagnated during the 1980s. Since 
this stagnation took place in the context of a strongly expanding labour market, 
union density (the number of unionized workers as a percentage of all workers) 
fell from about 31 per cent in 1980 to about 24 per cent in 1990 (Oesch 2008: 
27). For Switzerland’s trade union movement, however, the wake- up call only 
came with the sharp decline in membership in the early 1990s.
 Internationally, Switzerland today ranks in the bottom third in terms of union 
density, which is much higher in Austria, Belgium and, above all, the Scandin-
avian countries, similar in Germany and the Netherlands, but lower in France 
and the US (see Table 6.2).
Trade unions in the crisis of the 1990s
For Swiss unions, the recession of the early 1990s marked the beginning of a 
troubled period. Starting in 1991, Switzerland’s economy spent six years in a 
row with GDP growth rates below 1 per cent. This unusually long recession 
went hand in hand with fundamental economic restructuring and resulted in an 
increase in the level of unemployment from below 1 per cent in 1990 to over 5 
per cent in 1997 – levels unknown in Switzerland since the 1930s. Job losses 
were particularly large in those sectors in which the Swiss unions had tradition-
ally been strong: the machine industry and construction. The export- oriented 
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Figure 6.1  Evolution of membership in Switzerland’s peak associations, 1970–2008 
(source: Swiss Federal Office of Statistics).
Note
Travail.Suisse is a result of the merger in 2002 between the Catholic peak association CNG with 
several unions of the then-dissolved white-collar peak association VSA.
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machine industry had been hit very hard by the slump in world demand, a slump 
aggravated further by high interest rates (1990–2) and a swift appreciation in the 
value of the Swiss Franc (1994–6). Similarly, the sheltered construction industry 
underwent drastic downsizing after Switzerland’s real estate bubble burst at the 
beginning of the 1990s. As a result, both the building and machine industries 
lost one in four jobs during the recession.
 The construction and machine industries were the key sectors for the then two 
largest unions (which were later to merge into Unia): the construction workers’ 
union GBH/GBI and the metal workers’ union SMUV. The first lost 30 per cent, 
the second 17 per cent of its members between 1992 and 2000. While job losses 
were less severe in other sectors, the great majority of unions struggled with 
declining membership. Hence, over the same period, membership fell by 13 per 
cent in the public- sector union VPOD and 11 per cent in the public transport 
union SEV. At the level of the two peak associations SGB and Travail.Suisse, 
membership decreased by 14 and 10 per cent respectively between the beginning 
and the end of the 1990s. While this drop was less dramatic than in Germany 
(–33 per cent) and the UK (–23 per cent) over the same decade, it stands in stark 
contrast with the situation in other small countries such as Belgium, Denmark, 
the Netherlands or Norway, where the number of union members remained 
stable during the 1990s (Visser 2006: 43–4).
 In the 1990s, the failure of the Swiss unions to organize the private service 
sector and to establish themselves among white- collar employees came back to 
haunt them with a vengeance. In effect, the unions did not recover their member-
ship losses even after the labour market began to expand again after 1997. 
Although the recession had accelerated the decline, the main reasons for mem-
bership loss were structural: technological change (notably automation), educa-
tional expansion, service sector growth and occupational upgrading were all 
biased against Swiss unions’ traditional clientele of male manual manufacturing 
workers (Oesch 2006: 169). Accordingly, membership continued to fall and 
union density declined from about 24 per cent in 1990 to about 20 per cent in 
2000, before stabilizing at around 19 per cent in 2008 (own calculations based 
on information provided by the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics).3
 The long period of economic stagnation in the 1990s prompted a second chal-
lenge for the unions. In the midst of a stubborn recession, business representa-
tives began to question the ‘cumbersome’ institutions of corporatism and insisted 
on the ‘co- ordinated elimination of excessive regulation’ (Mach 2006: 276). The 
exponents of large, export- oriented firms in particular argued that their capacity 
to rapidly adjust to competitive pressures was curtailed by collective bargaining. 
Employers’ associations relayed this pressure in the different sectors by pushing 
for less constricting agreements and greater decentralization of wage setting.
 By and large, the employers’ initiatives were successful. The first victim of 
deregulation was the cost- of-living clauses which had been gradually included in 
most collective agreements over the 1970s. Between 1992 and 1996, the clauses 
linking wage adjustment to inflation disappeared, despite union resistance, from 
virtually all major sectoral agreements. In parallel, firms succeeded in increasing 
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their flexibility by shifting bargaining over working time from (constraining) 
weekly working hours to (more flexible) annualized time schemes (Mach and 
Oesch 2003: 167–8). The most important change in Swiss industrial relations, 
however, concerned the decentralization of collective bargaining: over the 
second half of the 1990s, wage bargaining was shifted from the sectoral to the 
company level in key industries such as banking and the chemical and printing 
industries. In these sectors, yearly wage rounds no longer take place between 
employers’ associations and trade unions for the entire industry, but between 
management and works councils within single firms. Given the weak legal posi-
tion of works councils, the move towards decentralization increased employers’ 
discretionary power in wage setting, led to stronger individualization of their 
wage policy and was strongly resented by unions (Mach and Oesch 2003: 166; 
Rieger 2009: 108–9). After four decades during which Switzerland’s system of 
industrial relations had remained largely unchanged – all the while setting down 
the incremental improvement of working conditions – the early 1990s brought 
about a significant dismantling of procedures and benefits.
 In this context of a recession- ridden labour market and disrupted social part-
nership, a third challenge to Switzerland’s labour movement surfaced: free 
movement of persons between Switzerland and the EU. Unlike problems linked 
with the long economic crisis and dislocated collective bargaining, the transition 
towards a liberal migration regime did not originate in domestic politics, but was 
a by- product of Switzerland’s increasing integration into the Common Market. 
For Switzerland it meant the opening of its hitherto highly bureaucratic immi-
gration regime and hence a significant change to its employment policy. 
Throughout the twentieth century, Switzerland had imported foreign workers in 
great numbers. While alleviating labour shortages, immigration also enabled the 
government to constantly adjust labour supply to cyclical upswings and down-
turns through the more or less restrictive use of quotas and work permits (Flück-
iger 1998: 384–5). Accordingly, annual net migration (immigration minus 
emigration) could oscillate between –66,900 at the height of the oil crisis in 1975 
and +57,100 at the very end of the economic boom in 1990. Moreover, in Swit-
zerland’s migratory regime, resident workers were always assured preference, 
since firms were authorized to employ foreign workers only if no residents had 
been willing to take up the job and working conditions were in line with local 
customs.
 The imminent introduction of free movement of persons would put an end to 
this protectionist migration system and hence abolish an important safeguard of 
working conditions in the Swiss labour market. This left unions facing a 
dilemma: on the basis of their pro- European stance and their universalist posi-
tion towards the defence of all workers’ rights, they had to welcome the aboli-
tion of a restrictive migratory regime. Based on their interest in limiting 
competition over jobs and enhancing their bargaining position through a tight 
labour market, however, they had to oppose the liberalization of labour migra-
tion. This seemed all the more urgent as wage differentials between Switzerland 
and the neighbouring countries were still substantial. Unions finally responded 
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by making their support of the opening conditional on the parallel political 
strengthening of workers’ rights (see below).
 In sum, the end of full employment, the disruption of consensual collective 
bargaining and the opening of the labour market towards Europe put an end to 
industrial relations as unions had known them for decades. Clearly, they needed 
to come up with new solutions.
Efforts to strengthen political influence and collective 
bargaining
The unions were taken by surprise by the new – and more difficult – external 
configuration of the 1990s. In spite of that, since they continued to be solidly 
implanted in Switzerland’s corporatist system and – through their close link with 
the Social Democratic Party – still carried considerable political weight, they 
muddled through and hoped for better times. It was only in the second half of the 
1990s that their continuous loss of members and influence on the industry – and, 
more importantly, on the company- level – made a strategic reorientation inevit-
able. This reorientation involved three distinct responses: (a) the strengthening of 
their role as political actors, (b) the adoption of new organizational strategies and 
a stronger focus on their strike capacity and (c) the concentration of resources 
through mergers. These responses shall each be discussed in turn below.
 In the 1990s, as the unions’ relationship with employers were becoming 
increasingly tense all over Europe, unions everywhere intensified their efforts to 
gain external support and to relaunch themselves as political actors (Baccaro et 
al. 2003: 119–20). Weakened in their role as the social partner in industrial rela-
tions, Swiss unions invested in the same strategy by turning to the legislative 
process and, above all, direct democratic instruments (Trampusch 2008: 70). 
Unions thus launched a series of referenda and succeeded in blocking projects 
aimed at making labour law more flexible (1996), reducing unemployment bene-
fits (1997), liberalizing the electricity market (2002) and retrenching pension 
rights (2004 and 2010) (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008: 109). Through these victories 
in referendum votes, the unions forced the parliament to develop more labour- 
friendly proposals. In parallel, they established themselves as Switzerland’s 
primary economic oppositional force. This represented a break with the past: 
Swiss unions had not launched a single referendum during the zenith of cor-
poratism from 1950 to 1970 (Degen 2006: 246).
 However, it was not in popular votes, but in the legislative arena that unions 
made the greatest headway. In 1999, they made their support for the bilateral 
treaty with the EU – and thus, inter alia, the introduction of free movement of 
persons – dependent on the adoption of compensatory domestic measures. Both 
the government and the business community were strongly in favour of a treaty 
designed to stabilize relations with the EU. Faced with opposition from the 
national- conservative camp, however, they needed the unions’ support to win 
the referendum. This gave unions the leverage to impose the so- called ‘flanking 
measures’, which brought about a re- regulation of labour law and a political 
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strengthening of collective bargaining (Fischer 2003; Afonso 2010; Maggetti et 
al. in this volume). Less than a decade after prominent business representatives 
had declared collective agreements a model of the past, employers’ associations 
had to accept the reinforcement of collectively agreed minimum wages, the facil-
itation of extension clauses and the hiring of works inspectors. These ‘flanking 
measures’ were to be overseen by tripartite labour commissions, set up on the 
national level and in the cantons in order to supervise the evolution of wages 
once free movement of persons had been introduced.
 It was thanks inter alia to these measures that the unions were able to turn the 
tide in collective bargaining. After almost a decade of decreasing bargaining 
coverage, the number of wage earners covered by an agreement started to rise 
again in 1999. From the pre- crisis level of 1,400 million covered employees in 
1991, coverage gradually dropped to 1,214 million in 1996, before rising again 
in 1999 (1,269 million) and increasing to 1,414 million in 2003. In 2007, an all- 
time high of 1,682 million employees were covered by a collective agreement. 
This corresponds to a coverage rate of about 50 per cent and signifies that about 
half of Swiss wage earners are subject to union- negotiated conditions of employ-
ment (Oesch 2007: 346). While Switzerland’s coverage rate is low by interna-
tional comparison (see Table 6.2 above), there has not been any erosion of 
collective bargaining as seen in the UK during the Conservative reign – when 
coverage fell from over 70 per cent in 1979 to less than 45 per cent in 1997 – or 
in Germany during the second half of the 1990s – when coverage dropped from 
70 to 60 per cent (Visser 2007).
 Collective bargaining expanded substantially despite the declining importance 
of the two flagship agreements of Swiss industrial relations: those of the machine 
and construction industries. Where, then, did growth in bargaining coverage take 
place? Three principal sources can be distinguished. First, the imminent intro-
duction of free movement of persons led Swiss authorities to ease union fears 
about wage dumping by more frequently declaring minimum wages in collective 
agreements compulsory for all firms in a given sector. These measures were sup-
ported not only by the unions, but also by business representatives from shel-
tered sectors, notably from the construction industry. These latter realized that 
compulsory minimum wages would make it more difficult for European firms to 
compete for service contracts in Switzerland by posting workers and benefiting 
from lower payrolls. Thus, the administrative extension of existing agreements 
to entire sectors significantly increased in importance between 1995 (when it 
concerned only 14 agreements covering 320,000 employees) and 2007 (when 68 
agreements covering 590,000 employees had been extended).
 European integration and the more active use of extension clauses are not the 
only factors explaining the turnaround in bargaining coverage. A second deter-
minant is the spread of collective agreements in formerly public utilities. With 
the abolition of civil servants’ special legal status in 2001, collective bargaining 
found its way first into Switzerland’s large infrastructure companies in postal 
services (Post), railways (SBB) and telecommunications (Swisscom). Shortly 
thereafter, an increasing number of (semi-)public establishments in public 
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transport, health care and social services followed suit. Accordingly, wage 
increases and working time of bus drivers, nurses, kindergarten teachers and 
social workers are increasingly determined in negotiations with unions. Finally, 
a third determinant of growing bargaining coverage is linked to the renewal in 
unions’ recruitment strategy in private services. Starting in the mid- 1990s, an 
intensification of efforts led to the expansion of collective agreements in low- 
skilled services such as cleaning, private security and retail trade. These efforts 
are discussed in the following section.
New union strategies of organizing in private services
In the 1960s, Stinchcombe (1965) already noted that trade unions continued to 
bear the ‘social imprint’ of the employment structure and organizational model 
of the time of their foundation. For Switzerland’s union movement, this observa-
tion still applied in the 1990s: membership was heavily dominated by production 
and maintenance workers in manufacturing, construction and public utilities, 
whereas women, workers in private services and white- collar employees consti-
tuted a negligible minority. In the early 1990s, large- scale de- industrialization 
and the crisis in construction had crudely exposed how narrow Swiss unions’ 
membership basis had become. In addition to their fragmentary organization in 
private services, unions were also confronted with the slow breakdown of their 
traditional recruitment strategy in manufacturing, notably in the machine indus-
try: in this key sector, they had – comparable to unions in Germany (Windolf 
and Haas 1989: 155) – traditionally depended on works councillors to recruit 
new members. In the wake of production automation and educational upgrading, 
however, seats on works councils were increasingly taken by white- collar 
employees who showed less allegiance to unions. Thus, this recruitment channel 
began to dry out. As a consequence, union strongholds were reduced in the 
1990s to construction and related crafts, watchmaking, a few large firms in the 
printing and machine industries, and the public utilities in the railways, post, 
telecommunications and public transport.
 Clearly, labour market evolution was biased against unions’ constituencies. 
With their backs to the wall, Swiss unionism’s most far- reaching reaction came 
from the two largest organizations at that time, GBI (construction) and SMUV 
(machines and watchmaking) who joined forces in 1996 to co- found the union 
start- up unia, with the aim of organizing workers in private services, notably in 
the retail trade, hotels and restaurants. This enterprise was successful; in the 
eight years between its foundation and its merger with three other unions into 
Unia, it led to 20,000 new union members and paved the way for its successor 
organization to make further membership gains in private services (Oesch 2008: 
32).
 Almost as significant as the gains in membership were the new forms of 
collective action, first tested in the start- up project unia. Since unia could not 
count on a strong membership base in private services, its strategy was to move 
industrial relations beyond the company level and transform it into a community 
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issue. An example was the successful low- wage campaign (1998–2004): prima-
rily targeting low- paid migrant and female workers in supermarkets, restaurants 
and hotels, it employed elements of the American organizing approach to put 
firms under pressure by mobilizing public opinion and consumers against unfair 
working conditions – the principle of naming and shaming. The result was a 
strengthening of sectoral minimum wages and collective bargaining in these 
low- pay sectors (Oesch and Rieger 2006: 279). This campaign revealed the two 
different logics of action inherent in the organizing model: while it places a great 
deal of emphasis on rank- and-file worker mobilization and media coverage, it 
depends to a large degree on professional organizers to bring in the harvest and 
affiliate new members (Baccaro et al. 2003: 123). Accordingly, the union appar-
atus became far more important for unia’s recruitment in the private services 
than it used to be in manufacturing firms with union- friendly works councils or 
in public utilities with strong union stewards.
 The new focus on organizing went hand in hand with a reorientation of 
unions’ approach towards industrial conflict. The deregulation strategy launched 
by business organizations in the early 1990s had caught the unions totally unpre-
pared. After several decades of consensual social partnership, they had lost their 
capacity to organize strikes and impose their interests away from the negotiating 
table. The advent of a new generation of union leaders, notably in GBI 1992 
(Vasco Pedrina), Unia 1996 (Andreas Rieger) and SGB 1998 (Paul Rechsteiner), 
slowly changed this situation. These academically trained unionists had been 
socialized in the movements of the New Left and viewed the corporatist legacy 
of their social- democratic predecessors with scepticism. They came to power 
during the recession with a programme to transform outdated ‘economic boom 
unionism’ into ‘unionism in times of crisis’ (Oesch 2007: 342). As a con-
sequence, the rehabilitation of strikes became a priority within GBI, Unia and 
the peak association SGB, and industrial conflict re- entered Swiss unions’ reper-
toire of action alongside rank- and-file mobilization and media campaigns. The 
most spectacular conflict took place in the construction industry, where a nation-
wide strike in 2002 forced employers to concede early retirement entitlement to 
construction workers, allowing them to retire at the age of 60 (instead of 65) at 
80 per cent of their last salary. In the following years, several smaller industries 
related to the construction industry followed suit, introducing similar regulations 
in their agreements. From a union point of view, these early retirement clauses 
in physically trying sectors are the decade’s most significant breakthrough in 
collective bargaining.
 The increase in industrial conflicts is clearly visible from the data on the 
changes in workdays lost due to strikes (see Figure 6.2). In the 1980s, an annual 
average of 0.4 workdays per 1,000 employees was lost – a value that gradually 
increased to 1.4 in the 1990s and to 2.9 in the 2000s. However, a comparison 
over time shows that this rise in the incidence of strike action does not signify 
the demise of an industrial relations system based on consensus and cooperation. 
Before Switzerland’s system of collective bargaining was established at the end 
of the 1940s, the number of workdays lost per 1,000 employees stood at a much 
Trade unions and industrial relations  95
higher level than today: at an annual average of 81 days in the 1910s, 37 in the 
1920s, 21 in the 1930s and five in the 1940s. Likewise, a look at international 
strike data show that Switzerland’s bargaining system is still among the most 
consensual (see Table 6.2 above). With the exception of Japan and possibly 
Austria and Germany in some years, strikes are still of much greater economic 
relevance in all other major European countries than in Switzerland. Hence, 
between 2000 and 2003, strikes led to many more workdays lost per 1,000 
employees in the UK (29), Sweden (42) or France (103) than in Switzerland 
(four) (Addison et al. 2007: 6). In other words, the increase in the number of 
strikes shown in Figure 6.2 does not indicate a radical change in Swiss industrial 
relations. Rather, it underlines how unusually consensual the decade of the 1980s 
was in the economic history of Switzerland (and Western Europe).
The process of trade union mergers
A treatment of unions’ revitalization strategies would be incomplete without a 
discussion of the merger process that seized Switzerland’s labour movement in 
the 1990s and led to a profound re- engineering of its structure. In the last 15 
years, union mergers have been high on the union agenda all over Western 
Europe, particularly so in the UK, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Sweden (Waddington 2006). Confronted with falling membership numbers, 
unions decided to cut personnel costs and overheads, to reduce inter- union com-
petition, to respond to members’ job mobility and to increase organizational effi-
ciency. Swiss unions were no exception. The waltz of mergers was initiated in 
1992 by the fusion of the large construction workers’ union GBH with the 
smaller industrial workers’ union GTCP. This merger unbalanced Switzerland’s 
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Figure 6.2  Workdays lost in strikes (days per 1,000 employees), 1968–2008 (sources: 
Federal Office of Statistics; Oesch 2007: 343).
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union structure, creating a configuration within the large peak association SGB 
in which the two dominant unions, GBI and SMUV, were active in recruitment 
areas that increasingly overlapped (in textiles, the chemical industry and diverse 
craft occupations). However, instead of heightened competition, the new situ-
ation led to stronger collaboration; the neoliberal turn in employers’ associations 
had brought the traditionally left- wing socialist GBI and the right- wing social- 
democratic SMUV closer together. Cooperation began in 1996 with the joint 
establishment of the union start- up mentioned earlier, unia, in the private ser-
vices. In a process that took almost ten years, this led the two unions to merge all 
their activities – as well as those of three smaller unions – in 2005 (Oesch 2008: 
32–3). The result was the creation of Unia, a conglomerate union based on a 
matrix organization with 14 regions and four economic sectors (construction, 
crafts, manufacturing, private services). As a typical blue- collar union, Unia’s 
implantation is particularly strong among foreign workers, who account for half 
of its membership.
 In the shadow of this mega- fusion, a series of smaller union mergers took 
place (see overview in Table 6.3). Most relevant was the one leading in 1998 to 
the creation of the multi- sector blue- collar union Syna, the Catholic equivalent 
of Unia. This merger illustrates that Switzerland’s union structure was redrawn 
along the historical cleavages: mergers took place within – but not across – peak 
associations. As a result, both confederations are dominated by a large private- 
sector (Unia and Syna) and several smaller public- sector unions (SEV, GeKo 
and VPOD within SGB, transfair within Travail.Suisse). This persistence of old 
division lines means that in most sectors, there is ongoing competition between 
unions for the representation of workers’ interests. In the machine industry, Unia 
thus bargains alongside Syna (the Catholic blue- collar union) and Angestellte 
Schweiz (the white- collar union).
 Although mergers have reduced the number of unions originally affiliated to 
SGB from 16 in 1990 to eight in 2008, the process of restructuring is probably 
not yet finished for Switzerland’s organized labour, in particular for fragmented 
public- sector unions. Even so, the redrawn union structure, notably the two 
multi- sector unions, poses serious challenges for the peak associations. Hence in 
2008, Unia alone accounted for 53 per cent of total membership in SGB, 
whereas Syna was responsible for 40 per cent of membership in Travail.Suisse. 
These are high proportions in international comparison: in Germany, the two 
largest unions, IG Metall and ver.di, account for 36 and 34 per cent respectively 
of DGB’s membership, whereas Unite and Unison contribute about 30 and 21 
per cent to membership in the UK’s TUC.
 Thus, the challenge faced by Switzerland’s peak associations is all too 
obvious: conglomerate unions – often the result of recent mergers – tend to 
become large enough to act alone as the interlocutor of government and business 
associations (Streeck and Visser 1997). SGB responded to this concentration by 
launching an offensive to integrate hitherto unaffiliated white- collar unions, 
notably in public administration and banking. Under the influence of heightened 
distributional tensions resulting from the recession and employers’ neoliberal 
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turn, these traditionally moderate white- collar unions shifted towards the polit-
ical left. As a consequence, nine additional unions, representing mainly white- 
collar employees and counting 45,000 members, joined SGB between 1998 and 
2009. Combined with Unia’s renewal efforts, these new affiliations enabled SGB 
to partially make up its long- standing deficit among women. After a decade of 
stagnation, SGB’s female membership thus began to rise in the 1990s, increas-
ing from 56,000 in 1990 to 80,000 in 2000 and reaching 101,000 in 2009 (SGB- 
Newsletter 4/2010).
 In the field of organizational consolidation, SGB’s Catholic concurrent CNG 
went a step further and merged with several white- collar unions in 2002 to form 
the new peak association Travail.Suisse. What was at stake in the initiatives of 
both SGB and Travail.Suisse was the tentative attempt to bring white- collar 
unions into the realm of the two (historically) blue- collar federations. The 
various mergers thus result in a situation where one- fifth of Switzerland’s white- 
collar unions are organized in SGB (notably bankers and federal public ser-
vants), another fifth in Travail.Suisse (notably employees in the machine and 
chemical industries), whereas the highly coveted rest remains, for the moment, 
unaffiliated (in particular teachers, policemen and nurses).
 While support for union restructuring by mergers is widespread among Euro-
pean trade union officials, external observers are more pessimistic as to their 
benefits. Baccaro and colleagues (2003: 125) argue with respect to Germany that 
union mergers have primarily been defensive, and contrast them with the revital-
ization efforts made in organizing by American unions. Similarly, Waddington 
(2006: 631) argues that mergers risk inhibiting renewal policies as attention is 
directed towards internal structural change at the expense of energies spent on 
revitalization. Syna’s post- merger experience seems to confirm the academics’ 
scepticism, as it closely mirrors the inconclusive result of the huge German 
union, ver.di: between 1998 and 2008, Syna’s membership declined by 20 per 
cent – a value comparable to ver.di’s membership loss of 22 per cent since its 
merger in 2001. In contrast, Unia has been able, thus far, to limit membership 
decline to a modest 4 per cent between 2004 and 2009.
Conclusion
After decades of stability, Switzerland’s union movement entered a phase of tur-
bulence in the early 1990s: its status as junior partner in the corporatist growth 
pact was challenged by the economic crisis, the neoliberal turn in business 
organizations and an abrupt decline in union membership. Switzerland’s infor-
mal system of wage regulation, based on the combination of full employment, 
collective agreements and restrictive immigration, thus came under pressure: the 
recession of the 1990s led to high levels of unemployment, firms pushed for the 
decentralization of wage bargaining and the bilateral agreements with the EU 
brought about a liberalization of the migratory regime. Interestingly, it was this 
latter element – the free movement of persons – that stabilized collective bar-
gaining: by creating a divide within the political right, European integration 
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forced employers to collaborate with unions in order to obtain sufficient political 
support. Business organizations thus traded a strengthening of tripartite labour 
market institutions against better access to the European market. As a result, the 
external liberalization of migration went hand in hand with domestic re- 
regulation of employment policy, reflected in increasing bargaining coverage 
and the growing importance of union- negotiated minimum wages.
 However, if Swiss unions have – at least partly – overcome adversity, this is 
due neither to European integration nor to direct- democratic veto points, but to 
their internal renewal strategies. European integration provided unions with 
political leverage only once they had decided in the mid- 1990s to break with 
their traditional pro- European positions – at the risk of alienating their strongly 
pro- European social- democratic partner – and make their support conditional on 
side- payments from employers. Likewise, while direct- democratic institutions 
provide unions with the opportunity to block unpopular reforms, the collection 
of signatures and the running of voting campaigns imply considerable financial 
strains (campaign costs) and opportunity costs (unions’ daily business at the 
workplace, where members are recruited, is neglected). Most importantly, 
however, unions are capable of cashing in their influence at the polls and in tri-
partite consultation bodies only as long as they are backed up by a solid mem-
bership basis. An organization without a strong power base rapidly becomes 
irrelevant in politics, be it direct- democratic or representative.
 Hence, what is decisive for the accomplishment of the unions’ mission – the 
improvement of wage earners’ employment conditions – is their influence at the 
level of firms and industries. This influence is, in turn, a function of their mem-
bership basis and, additionally, their mobilization capacity. In other words, the 
role of the unions in Switzerland’s political economy crucially depends on their 
capacity to keep old members and recruit new ones. Having missed out the trans-
ition from high industrialism to a service economy in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
unions struggled with a significant backlog in the organization of new sectors. 
This explains the Swiss peculiarity that construction workers represent organized 
labour’s most important stronghold, while the public- sector unions organizing 
welfare state workers are – in stark contrast to the situation in Denmark or 
Sweden – both much smaller and less influential.
 Notwithstanding this delay, Swiss unions did engage in organizational and pro-
grammatic renewal. In addition to the rationalization of their organizational struc-
ture through mergers, they affiliated several white- collar unions, implanted 
themselves in low- skilled services and adopted the organizing approach. Here, 
their strategy resided in moving industrial relations beyond the company level and 
transforming it, through media campaigns, into a community issue. This reorienta-
tion was led by Unia and went hand in hand with the more frequent use of strikes. 
Efforts proved successful both in the traditional stronghold of construction and the 
new recruitment area of supermarkets, hotels and restaurants. In the former, payoff 
came in the form of mainly employer- financed early retirement. In the latter, 
investment in organizing activities resulted in membership growth and the setting-
 up of new collective agreements. Nonetheless, the transition from manufacturing 
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to private services has proved tricky for the unions. Not only are the rotation rates 
among members significantly higher and membership contributions lower in 
private services than in manufacturing.4 Moreover, as long as unions cannot count 
on organizational relays in private services, such as works councils in manufactur-
ing or shop stewards in public utilities, expansion remains a costly undertaking.
 It is thus a reasonable guess to see skilled employees in public services as the 
key for the future of Switzerland’s labour movement. While white- collar unions 
organizing the expanding occupations in health care, education and the police 
often feature a high density rate, they are fragmented, lack professional appar-
atus and are mostly situated outside the two peak associations. Even so, it is dif-
ficult to predict a serene future for Swiss unionism unless these white- collar 
unions rationalize their structure, enter into larger alliances and begin to shape 
industrial relations alongside their counterparts in construction, public utilities, 
manufacturing and private services.
Notes
1 Helpful comments made on earlier versions of this chapter by Andreas Rieger and 
Peter Sigerist are gratefully acknowledged.
2 While full employment strengthened workers’ bargaining positions, migration policy 
enshrined job preference of residents over migrants – who, moreover, could only be 
employed after the authorities had deemed their work contracts to be in accordance 
with regional working conditions.
3 The concept of union density is notoriously difficult to apply empirically. It is meant to 
express the rate of ‘actual’ to ‘potential’ membership: the rate of union members over 
wage earners. Since the small non- affiliated unions are often not included in the official 
statistics, actual membership is very difficult to measure. Moreover, unions providing 
data on actual membership tend not to provide separate figures for employed and 
retired members (an estimated 15 per cent of union members in SGB are retired). 
Nonetheless, a comparison with survey results stemming from the Swiss Household 
Panel suggests that our calculations above are reliable: in 1999, 24 per cent of wage 
earners declared that they were a member of a union or professional association (Oesch 
2006: 168).
4 Between 2006 and 2008, Unia’s annual exit rate among members in private services 
averaged 17 per cent as compared to 11 per cent in manufacturing.
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